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During June 2–8, 2009, an outbreak of influenza A pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 occurred among 31 members of a tour 
group in China. To identify the mode of transmission and risk 
factors, we conducted a retrospective cohort investigation. 
The index case-patient was a female tourist from the United 
States. Secondary cases developed in 9 (30%) tour group 
members who had talked with the index case-patient and in 
1 airline passenger (not a tour group member) who had sat 
within 2 rows of her. None of the 14 tour group members 
who had not talked with the index case-patient became ill. 
This outbreak was apparently caused by droplet transmis-
sion during coughing or talking. That airborne transmission 
was not a factor is supported by lack of secondary cases 
among fellow bus and air travelers. Our findings highlight 
the need to prevent transmission by droplets and fomites 
during a pandemic. 
S
ince the emergence of a novel influenza A (H1N1) vi-
rus (later called influenza A pandemic [H1N1] 2009 
virus) in early 2009 in Mexico (1,2), the virus has spread to 
156 countries, territories, and areas; as of July 27, 2009, a 
total of 134,503 laboratory-confirmed cases and 816 deaths 
had been reported (3). On June 11, 2009, the World Health 
Organization declared that the world was experiencing the 
start of the 2009 influenza pandemic (4). Investigations of 
transmission chains early in the pandemic will add to our 
understanding of the special characteristics of this new vi-
rus, including whether its mode of transmission differs from 
that of seasonal influenza viruses. This information will be 
useful for effective control of the spread of this virus.
In the People’s Republic of China, the early response 
strategy has been containment, which includes temperature 
screening and administration of health questionnaires at 
international ports of entry, isolation of infected travelers, 
and quarantine of close contacts of infected persons. Dur-
ing June 2–8, 2009, an outbreak of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
occurred among members of a tour group. We investigated 
this outbreak to identify the source of infection, mode of 
transmission, and risk factors for infection.
Methods
The index case-patient was a 40-year-old female US 
citizen who had traveled from the United States to Jiu-
zhaigou, a popular tourist spot in southwestern China; she 
stopped to change planes in Hong Kong and Chengdu. She 
noticed her first symptom, chills, on June 2, immediately 
before arriving in Chengdu, ≈23 hours after departure from 
the United States. After learning that she had traveled on 3 
flights and had toured with a group, we obtained the mani-
fests of all flights that she had traveled on and asked all pas-
sengers of the 3 flights and all members of the tour group 
by telephone or in-person interview whether they had had 
any symptoms from May 27 through June 12, 2009. We 
also obtained detailed information on the activities of the 
tour group during the 3-day tour. Health authorities placed 
members of the tour group under medical observation and 
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isolated those who had clinical signs or symptoms or posi-
tive  throat  swab  culture  results.  Laboratory  technicians 
at the Sichuan Province Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention collected throat swabs every 24 hours from all 
members of the tour group and from symptomatic persons 
who had shared any of the 3 flights with the index case-pa-
tient. Real-time reverse transcription–PCR (RT-PCR) was 
performed to detect nucleic acids specific for the influenza 
A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus by using the primers sup-
plied by the World Health Organization.
We defined a suspected case as onset of >1 of 5 symp-
toms—fever (>38°C), cough, sore throat, chills, or head-
ache—in a passenger of flight CZ6659 (June 3, Chengdu 
to  Jiuzhaigou)  or  flight  CZ6660  (June  5,  Jiuzhaigou  to 
Chengdu) or in a member of the tour group. A confirmed 
case was a suspected case for which real-time RT-PCR 
provided laboratory confirmation of the influenza A pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection. A secondary case was 
a confirmed case for which the patient’s signs or symptoms 
began after 9:00 p m on June 3, i.e., at least 24 hours after the 
onset of the primary (index) case.
To identify the mode of transmission and risk factors 
for infection, we conducted a retrospective cohort investi-
gation. We interviewed all members of the tour group by 
telephone or in-person interview to ascertain details of their 
contact history with the index case-patient.
Results
During this outbreak, we identified a total of 11 con-
firmed cases of influenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infec-
tion (Figure 1). Average patient age was 36 (range 18–59) 
years; 2 patients were men and 9 were women. Signs and 
symptoms  were  cough  (73%),  fever  (64%),  sore  throat 
(64%), headache (27%), chills (27%), runny nose (18%), 
and myalgia (18%). All 11 case-patients fully recovered; 3 
(including the index case-patient) recovered on June 13, 5 
on June 15, 1 on June 17, and 2 on June 18. The mean dura-
tion of illness was 11 (range 9–14) days.
The  index  case-patient  left  New  York  City,  United 
States,  on  flight  CX841  at  12:00  a m   (midnight)  June  2 
and arrived in Hong Kong at 2:00  p m on the same day. 
She transferred to flight CA428 (Boeing 757), which de-
parted Hong Kong at 7:25 p m and arrived in Chengdu at 
10:00 p m. On June 3, she and her family members joined 
the tour group at the Chengdu Airport and boarded flight 
CZ6659 (Boeing 757), which departed Chengdu at 12:25 
p m and arrived at Jiuzhaigou (33°15′55′′N, 104°13′35′′E; 
average altitude 2,930 m) at 1:10 p m. The group picked up 
7 additional members in Jiuzhaigou, where they traveled to 
various tourist attractions by bus and participated in group 
activities during the ensuing 3 days. On June 5, the original 
24 members of the tour group from Chengdu (without the 7 
members who had joined the group in Jiuzhaigou) boarded 
flight CZ6660 (Boeing 757), which departed Jiuzhaigou at 
1:30 p m and arrived in Chengdu at 2:15 p m, along with 87 
other passengers (Figure 2).
All airplanes boarded by the index case-patient had 
high-efficiency particulate air filters. Less than half of the 
air in the passenger cabins was recirculated; the rest was 
from outside. Air in the passenger cabins of the airplanes 
was recirculated approximately every 3 minutes. The air 
conditioning system in the tour bus mixed ≈70% recircu-
lated inside air with ≈30% outside air, filtered it, and deliv-
ered it into the bus through air outlets above the passenger 
seats. A vent at the back of the bus continually exhausted 
air from inside the bus.
The diagnosis of influenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus infection was made for the index case-patient after she 
returned to Chengdu on June 5. Subsequently, members of 
the tour group were placed under involuntary medical ob-
servation. No influenza-like illness developed in any of the 
91 passengers of flight CA428 (Hong Kong to Chengdu) 
or in any of the 87 passengers on flight CZ6659 (Chengdu 
to Jiuzhaigou) who were not members of the tour group. 
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Figure 1. Time of disease onset for persons infected with influenza 
A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, Sichuan Province, China, June 
2009.
Figure 2. Timeline of exposures to the index case-patient during 
outbreak of influenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Sichuan Province, 
China,  June  2009.  Numbers  in  parentheses  indicate  number  of 
persons exposed.RESEARCH
None of the passengers on either flight had donned a mask. 
However, excluding the index case-patient, 9 (30%) of the 
30 members of the tour group became ill with secondary 
cases of disease. The secondary attack rate did not differ 
between the members of the tour group who flew from 
Chengdu to Jiuzhaigou and the members who joined the 
tour in Jiuzhaigou. Of the 87 passengers on the return flight 
(Jiuzhaigou to Chengdu) on June 5 who were not members 
of the tour group, 1 person became ill (Table 1). Her seat 
(9A) was within 2 rows of seats of the index case-patient 
(7A) and a secondary case-patient (7B), each of whom was 
symptomatic during the return flight from Jiuzhaigou to 
Chengdu on June 5.
Among members of the tour group, the attack rate was 
higher for women (50%) than for men (13%) (2-tailed Fish-
er exact test, p = 0.05). The secondary attack rate among 
persons 18–39 years of age was 41% (7/17; exact 95% 
confidence interval [CI] 18–67) compared with 21% (3/14; 
exact 95% CI 4.7–51) for persons 40–63 years of age.
The index case-patient began having chills at ≈9:00 p m 
during her flight from Hong Kong to Chengdu. She started 
coughing before she boarded the flight from Chengdu to 
Jiuzhaigou on June 3 and continued to cough during the 
entire  tour  and  after  she  returned  to  Chengdu.  She  had 
extensive interactions with other members of the group, 
who talked with each other, helped each other take pic-
tures, gave chewing gum to each other, had group meals 
together, and stayed in the same hotel. During the 3-day 
trip, the group traveled together in an air-conditioned tour 
bus; doors were shut and windows were sealed to conserve 
energy. While traveling among the various tourist attrac-
tions, the group was together on bus rides for a total of 
6 hours and 50 minutes. When we evaluated the contact 
patterns of the tour group with the index case-patient, we 
found that for the 16 tourists who had talked with the in-
dex case-patient from close range (<2 m) for >2 minutes, 
the attack rate was 56%, whereas none of the 14 tourists 
who did not talk with her became ill. Members of the tour 
group who had talked with the index case-patient for >10 
minutes were almost 5× as likely to become ill than those 
who had talked with her for 2–9 minutes (Table 2). The 14 
passengers who had not talked with the index case-patient 
did report other interactions with her, such as dining at the 
same table, sitting within 2 rows on the same flight or bus 
ride, and receiving chewing gum from her. Moreover, 3 of 
these 14 uninfected passengers had sat within 2 seats of the 
index case-patient during the bus rides but had never talked 
with her from close range.
Discussion
Since  its  emergence,  pandemic  (H1N1)  2009  has 
spread around the world, including 1,930 confirmed cases 
in China as of July 27, 2009 (5). Of the cases that have 
occurred in China (excluding Hong Kong, Macao, and Tai-
wan), >80% have been imported (6); however, several out-
breaks caused by transmission from imported case-patients 
have also occurred in China. Our investigation documented 
1 such outbreak.
Seasonal influenza A is transmitted directly by large 
droplets, or indirectly by fomites (7). However, the trans-
mission dynamics of the influenza A pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus have been less well researched. Our data show 
that this outbreak was caused by talking with the index 
case-patient at close range, which indicates droplet trans-
mission. Conversely, other kinds of contact, such as dining 
at the same table and receiving chewing gum from the in-
dex case-patient, played no role during this outbreak.
The role of airborne transmission for influenza is de-
batable (7–10). Our investigation did not find evidence of 
airborne transmission during this outbreak. The lack of cas-
es among 14 tourists who were with the index case-patient 
in an enclosed bus cabin for nearly 7 hours suggests that 
airborne transmission was not a factor. The absence of sec-
ondary cases among passengers of the flight from Chengdu 
to Jiuzhaigou also supports this conclusion. Although the 
case-patient with disease onset on June 8 appeared to have 
been infected while sharing the flight from Jiuzhaigou to 
Chengdu, she sat within 2 seats of 2 symptomatic case-
patients, which is also consistent with droplet or fomite 
transmission.
During this outbreak, the index case-patient was fe-
brile while traveling on 3 flights. A secondary case-pa-
tient was also febrile while traveling on the return flight 
(Jiuzhaigou  to  Chengdu).  Neither  patient’s  illness  was 
detected by thermal scanning at the airports. Another sec-
ondary case-patient had had a headache during the return 
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Table 1. Secondary attack rate for influenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009, by travel history, Sichuan Province, China, June 2009 
Group    Total no. persons  No. cases  Attack rate, % 
Passengers on flight CA428 (Hong Kong–Chengdu), June 2  91 0 0
Passengers on flight CZ6659 (Chengdu–Jiuzhaigou), June 3  110 7 6.4
  Members of the tour group  23 7 30
  Not members of the tour group  87 0 0
Members of the tour group, not passengers of flight CZ6659 (Chengdu–Jiuzhaigou), 
June 3 
7 2 29
Passengers on flight CZ6660 (Jiuzhaigou–Chengdu), June 5, not members of the 
tour group 
87 1 1.1Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Tour Group, China
flight. The index case-patient filled out a health question-
naire but did not truthfully inform health authorities of 
her symptoms. The other 9 case-patients began having 
symptoms after returning home; hence, they were also 
not detected by airport screening. These data suggest that 
thermal scanning and health questionnaires at the airports 
were not effective for detecting pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
infections.
The main limitation of our investigation was the pos-
sibility of recall bias; i.e., those who became ill might have 
more accurately recalled their contact history than those 
who did not. However, the index case-patient had a highly 
distinctive hairstyle, which made her easy to remember. 
Also, interviews about the tourists’ exposure to the index 
case-patient were conducted within 1 week of the comple-
tion of their tour. These 2 factors should have helped mini-
mize any potential recall bias.
In conclusion, this outbreak of influenza A pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus infection was caused by transmission 
during coughing or vocalization by an imported case-pa-
tient. The virus spread by droplet transmission when the 
index case-patient was talking with her fellow tourists. The 
findings of our investigation highlight the importance of 
preventing droplet transmission during a pandemic.
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Table 2. Secondary attack rate of influenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 among the tour group members, by exposure, Sichuan Province,
China, June 2009* 
Exposure
Total no. 
persons No. cases 
Secondary attack 
rate, %  Rate ratio (95% CI) 
Seat proximity to index case-patient during flight CZ6659, Chengdu–Jiuzhaigou, June 3 
  >2 rows   19 5 26 Referent
<2 rows   4 2 50 1.9 (0.35–5.7) 
Seat proximity to index case-patient during bus rides 
  Never <2 rows   8 2 25 Referent
  Ever <2 rows   22 7 32 1.3 (0.39–6.0) 
Talked with index case-patient from <2 m for >2 min 
  Yes  16 9 56 f (2.4–f)
  No  14 0 0 Referent
Length of conversation with index case-patient 
>10 min  10 8 80 4.8 (1.2–70) 
  2–9 min  6 1 17 Referent
*CI, confidence interval. 